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THE PARTIAL TAKING OF PUBLIC UTILITY
PROPERTY: AWARDING OF DAMAGES
UNDER "UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES"
In Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that where
land belonging to a public utility, which was necessary for the
continued service of the public, was condemned by eminent domain, the measure of damages to be awarded included the replacement or restoration cost of the condemned land. Although
this holding was a departure from the normal rules of valuation
in condemnation proceedings, the majority felt the unusual circumstances of the case justified the ruling. This Note will examine
the currently accepted methods of determining "just compensation' ' 2 in the partial taking of public utility lands, and will analyze
the reasoning behind cases which award replacement or restoration costs.
Pennsylvania Gas and Water arose following the condemnation of approximately thirteen and one-half acres of land belonging to the Pennsylvania Gas and Water Company, a public utility
located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. The condemner,
the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, acting under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Northeastern Extension Act
of September 27, 1951,8 took the land for the construction of the
Northeast Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The condemnee claimed the land taken was essential; the land was to be
the site of the dam for a reservoir which the condemnee would
have to build in the near future, to enable it to fulfill its obligation
of providing adequate water for its service area. The condemnee

contended the damages awarded should be measured by either
the cost of replacing the entire tract of land with a suitable
substitute, or by the cost of restoring the present site to its
original capacity 4 by erecting a retaining wall along the portion
1.

428 Pa. 74, 236 A.2d 112 (1967).

2. Just compensation is a nebulous term used by courts with respect
to eminent domain which is defined as full indemnity or remuneration for

loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or injured.
State ex rel. N.W. Electric Power Corp. v. Waggoner, 319 S.W.2d 930, 934
(Mo. 1959).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 660.8(a) (1961). This section states:
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to condemn, by resolution, any lands, interest in lands, property rights,
rights of way, franchises, easements and other property deemed

necessary or convenient for the construction and efficient operation
of the turnpike. . ..

4. The original capacity of the site was to be a quarter of a billion
gallons of water. The owner of the land proposed to prove that as a re-
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of land taken.
The condemner, on the other hand, contended that the trial
court was correct in not admitting evidence of the cost of a comparable site or the cost of a retaining wall. It argued the proper
measure of damages was the difference in value of the whole
property before and after the taking.
The Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County had
awarded the Gas and Water Company seventy-two thousand dollars as "just compensation." This award was based on a ruling
that the "highest and best" use of the land was for development
for residential and commercial purposes. Evidence of a potential
use of the land for reservoir purposes was considered remote
and speculative and therefore not admissible. Because of this,
the court refused to allow replacement or restoration costs. 5 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that peculiar
circumstances existed which justified the replacement or restoration of the land as a reservoir site.
METHODS OF VALUATION IN A PARTIAL TAKING

In legal valuations the courts recognize a close relationship
between what property is worth and what the owner of the property would suffer if he were deprived of his land. In the law of
damages and of eminent domain, the object of money compensation is to make the owner pecuniarily as near to whole as possible.0
The issue presently confronting courts awarding damages to a
public utility whose land has been condemned is whether valuation should continue to be based on the traditional methods used
on private property. Before discussing which standard should be
adopted, it is necessary to define and describe the commonly accepted methods of land valuation.
In awarding damages for the taking of a part of a parcel of
land for public use by the power of eminent domain, the courts
use one of three methods: (1) the "value plus damages" rule;
(2) the "before and after" rule; and (3) the "replacement cost
and/or restoration cost" method. The first method awards damages based on the market value of the land taken plus the difference in the market value of the remaining area before and after
sult of the taking any reservoir which could be constructed would be reduced to 8.9 acres (compared to the original 45 acre proposed site) with a

capacity of eighteen million gallons of water.
5.

Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 469, January

Term, 1960. A discussion of the first issue is covered in note 21 infra.
6.

1 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PaOPERTY 73 (1965).

the taking.7 A formulation of this concept is: Value of Land
Taken & (Value of Remainder Area Before Taking-Value of
Remainder Area After Taking) = Just Compensation." In utilizing the "value plus damages" rule, the Court of Appeals of Ohio,
in In Re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes9 arrived at three questions to be answered:
(1) What is the fair and reasonable market value of the
area sought to be appropriated; (2) What is the fair and
reasonable market value of the residue prior to the appropriation; and (3) What will be the fair and reasonable market value of the residue after the appropriation, the difference between the two latter figures reflecting the damages.' 0
A similar method of valuation is the second or "before and
after" rule by which damages are computed as the difference between the value of the entire tract before the taking and the
value of the remaining amount of land of the condemnee after
the taking. This is expressed by the formula: Value of Entire
Parcel Before Taking - Value of the Remainder Area After Taking
= Just Compensation."
The above two methods are similar and often result in equal
awards. Both are based on the concept that the primary considerations are the market value of the tract of land and the loss
to the owner as a result of the condemnation of part of the tract.
The "value plus damages" rule raises a number of problems
which are not present in the "before and after" rule. The first
method requires the jury to apportion the value of the whole tract
prior to the taking between the value of the part eventually taken
and that part not taken. In order to adequately measure the
damages, the jury must consider the relationship of the remainder
to the original tract. 12 If the jury is not careful in defining the
damages to the remainder, the dichotomy between the part taken
and the remainder may result in overlapping and the award of
double damages. On the other hand, failure to carefully define
the resulting damages may result in overlooking some damage,
and the withholding of adequate compensation.'3
Even though the first method has been accepted in the majority of jurisdictions, more recent cases 1 have recognized the
7. Adirondack Power and Light Corp. v. Evans, 226 App. Div. 490,
235 N.Y.S. 569 (1929); Petition of Westinghouse Water Co., 388 Pa. 282, 13
A.2d 72 (1940); Appalachin Elec. Power Co. v. Gorman, 191 Va. 344, 61 S.E
33 (1950).
8. 4 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN 534 (3d Ed. Rev., 1962)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
9. 93 Ohio App. 179, 112 N.E.2d 411 (1952).
10. Id. at 180, 112 N.E.2d at 413.
11. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 540.
12. Id. at 555.
13. I L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 301
(2d ed. 1953).

14. United States v. 3,065.94 Acres of Land, 187 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Cal.
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inherent problems in it, and lean toward the usage of the "before
and after" rule. For example, the Supreme Court of New York,
in a case involving acquisition of private property for the construction of a public water reservoir stated:
If a portion [of the owner's land] only is taken, the
owner is entitled to be compensated for the difference between the fair value of the entire property and that of the
remainder, after the needed portion has been preempted.
.. . In determining the value of the portion not taken, all
damages resulting thereto by reason of the use to which the
part appropriated is to be put must be taken into consideration. 15
The third method of awarding damages in order to achieve
"just compensation" has been developed from situations created
when a partial taking involved "unusual circumstances." If the
remaining area has been left in a valueless condition, then the
award should be the same as upon a complete taking. If, however,
the cost of restoring the remainder to its most advantageous use
will result in diminishing the amount of damages, the award should
be computed using the cost of the necessary repairs as a guideline.
This concept results in the following equations:
(a) Remainder of No Value:
Value of Entire Tract = Just Compensation,
(b) Remainder Area . . . which may be Rehabilitated:
Value of Part Taken & Cost of Rehabilitation - Value
Recovered by Reconstruction
Just Compensation or
Value of Entire Tract = Just Compensation (whichever result is less).16
17
An example of this method of valuation is Chicago v. Callender,
which considered the condemnation of private land and buildings
for public use. The Supreme Court of Illinois held:
Where a part, only, of a property is taken, if the
jury determines that what remains is worthless, it should
award as damages the value of the whole property....
If, on the other hand, the jury determines that the part
of the building remaining may be rehabilitated according to
some feasible and economical plan shown by the evidence,
and that by such rehabilitation the damages can be minimized so that they will be less than . . . if the remaining
portion of property be regarded as of no value, they should
allow as damages to the portion of property not taken, the
-

1960); Pomeroy v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 377, 191 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 159 A.2d 881 (1960).
15. Spring Valley Water and Supply Co. v. Haslach, 24 Misc. 2d 730,
202 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
16. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 542.
17. 396 Ill. 371, 71 N.E.2d 643 (1947).

cost of such rehabilitation less the value recovered by
such reconstruction.' 8
REQUIREMENTS FOR USAGE OF THE THIRD METHOD

In Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission,9 the issue was whether the third method could be
used in measuring the damages to be awarded. As stated previously, the majority recognized that its decision was not along
traditional lines, but felt that if the circumstances were uncommon
enough, evidence of replacement costs and/or restoration cost must
be admitted in order to ensure an equitable result. The dissent,
however, maintained that in Pennsylvania the test of damages in
awarding "just compensation" has always been and should continue to be, the difference between the market value of the entire
property before and after the taking. 20 The issue, therefore, lies
in a confrontation between the "before and after" method of valu21
ation and the "replacement and/or restoration cost" method.
A case cited by both the majority and dissenting opinions,
McSorely v. Avalon Borough School District,22 held that evidence
of the replacement value of the plaintiff's buildings should not
be received, "unless the circumstances were so peculiar as to render it absolutely essential, in the interest of justice, to require
its admission. ' 23 The dissent interpreted McSorely as saying that
replacement cost has no probative value and is not proper evidence
for any purpose. The majority, however, used the ruling in that
case to justify the contention that situations exist which are so
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 374, 71 N.E.2d at 647.
428 Pa. 74, 236 A.2d 112 (1967).
Id. at 85, 236 A.2d at 119 (dissenting opinion).

21. Prior to ruling on the issue of the proper measure of damages to

be used, the court ruled on another question. This was whether the
Pennsylvania Gas and Water Company should be allowed to show that the
highest and best use of the whole tract of land was as a site for the construction of a reservoir, even though at the time of the condemnation no
physical improvements had been made on the property.
The lower court ruled that the use of the property as a reservoir was
mere speculation and not provable as the highest and best use. The supreme
court, however, held that since the property was naturally suited for use as
a reservoir, and because of the need for additional water supplies for the
community, the highest and best use was as a reservoir, and the damages
should be awarded based on this fact.
In arriving at this decision, the court felt that there are two requirements for proving highest and best use. First, the condemnee must show
the physical adaptability of the land to such a use, and second it must
demonstrate that this use is needed in the area. If the land in question
satisfies these two requirements, then it is not speculative to consider it for
the use proposed. The fact that the land is not being used for the highest
and best use at the present time does not make it speculative provided
there is a need for it to be used in the capacity for which it is naturally
suited.
22. 291 Pa. 252, 139 A. 848 (1927).
23. Id. at 254, 139 A. at 849.
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uncommon as to allow the consideration of replacement and/or
restoration value.
To escape valuation by the traditional "value plus damages"
and "before and after" methods, a case must fulfill the prerequisites of "unusual and peculiar" circumstances. These are (1) the
portion of land taken must belong to a public service corporation;
(2) it must be essential to the fulfillment of the public service corporation's duties to the public, and (3) it must be the type of
land which does not facilitate itself to valuation by any other
24
method.
The first requirement was defined in United States v. Board
of Education.25 There the court considered a determination of
the method of valuation when land and buildings belonging to a
county were condemned by the government for a flood control
project. The government, on appeal, contended that it was not
proper for the Board of Education to introduce evidence of the
value of property which would have to be acquired if the land
taken was to be replaced., In affirming the district court, the
court of appeals stated thatOrdinarily .
market value is the measure of compensation in condemnation cases; and the difference in market
value of the residue before and after taking is ordinarily
a fair measure of severance damages. . . . [H] owever, we
are not to make a fetish of market value "since it may not
be the best measure of value in some cases." Where the
highest and best use of the property is for municipal or
governmental purposes, as to which no market value properly exists, some other methods of arriving at just compensation must be adopted, and the cost of providing property
in substitution for the26property taken may reasonably be
the basis of the award.
This ruling demonstrates the first prerequisite necessary for
application of the "replacement and/or restoration principle." In
awarding just compensation, the courts attempt to insure that
the amount awarded is "just" not only to the condemnee, but also
to the public, in whose name the condemner acts. To protect
the public in eminent domain proceedings, the courts tend to treat
public service corporations in a different manner than private property owners. Special treatment is warranted for a number of
24. United States v. Board of Educ 253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958);
State v. Waco Independent School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Union Free School Dist. No. 8 v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.Y.S.2d

416 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
25.

253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958).

26. Id. at 763.

reasons. The primary reason is that the public landowner owes a
duty to the general public, either because of a statuory obligation
or because of a franchise it has assumed. An example of the
special consideration given a public servant is found in the taking,
completely or partially, of public school property. Such property,
unlike private property, is neither traded nor sold on the open
27
market. The court in State v. Waco Independent School District
addressed itself to these considerations:
[T] he value of what the school has or what it has lost is
not the inquiry before us; that inquiry is the cost of restoring the remaining facilities to a utility for school purposes equal to that enjoyed prior to the taking if2 the facility
is reasonably needed to fill a public requirement. 1
State v. Waco recognized that a basic difference exists between
the obligation assumed by an agency condemning property owned
by another public agency, and the obligation it assumes when
condemning private property. The court held that:
This distinction lies in the obligation imposed on the condemnee. For example, a private party owes no duty to the
public to continue its operation either at its original location or elsewhere. It can move, it can stay, or it can liquidate as it alone sees fit. Not so with a school system
charged with a legal obligation to the public. A school
system suffering the loss of one of its schools by condemnation must replace that school when the facility is necessary
to the education of its children. . . . This is a legally imposed duty on the school district; and it has no other choice. 9
The fact that the land to be taken is owned by a municipal
corporation or a public utility does not in itself remove the case
from the traditional methods of computing damages. The second
reason for special treatment of public utility properties is that the
public servant, if deprived of land or a facility, will be unable to
fulfill its legal commitment to the public.
The New York Court of Claims raised the distinction between
land needed for a specific purpose by the utility and land having
no special value, in a case involving the taking of part of the land
of a school district for highway purposes. 0 The court held that
for the "substitution theory" to be used, as in State v. Waco, the
claimant's use of its land prior to the taking must have been so
complete that a partial taking would render the entire tract useless. In such a case, for the claimant to adequately fulfill his
duties, he must be provided with an entirely new tract."' In the
New York case, the portion taken for highway purposes was not in
27. 364 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
28. Id. at 266.
29. Id. at 268.
30. Union Free School Dist. No. 8 v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.Y.S.
2d 416 (Ct. Cl. 1962).

31. Id. at 374, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
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any manner presently connected to the activities of the school district, nor was the land specifically suited for use as an educational
facility to the virtual exclusion of all other land in the area. Plans
had been made for eventual use of the land, but these plans did
not specifically hinge upon the site in question. They could have
been used on any site of comparable size with a minimum of
32
alteration.
The second basic element which is necessary for use of the
replacement or substitution theory is that the land must be vital
to the service which the public utility is required to render to the
public. The court must find that if the utility were deprived of the
use of the land taken, or a suitable replacement, then it would not
be able to function satisfactorily. Courts have not been willing to
apply the replacement value concept to the determination of rates
a public service corporation is allowed to charge,33 or to condemnation proceedings in which part of a utility chain is taken by a
municipality for its own use and self-management.3 4 In such
instances, courts have refused to depart from the application of
either the "value plus damages" method or the "before and after";
rule.
The third prerequisite for use of the substitution theory is
"that there be no other method to determine the claimant's pecuniary loss.1 33

As shown in the prior discussion of the two usual

methods of determining "just compensation" under eminent domain proceedings, 6 the "fair market value" of the land taken and
of the remainder is essential to the "value plus damages" and
"before and after" rules. If a "fair market value" can be deter32.

Id.

This is a land33. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 454 (1913).
mark decision dealing with railroads. In ruling whether rates are confiscatory, the court held that
where the inquiry is as to the fair value of the property, in
order to determine the reasonableness of the return allowed by
the rate-making power, it is not admissible to attribute to the
property owned by the carriers a speculative increment of value of
similar property owned by others, solely by reason of the fact that
it is used in the public service. The land must be vital and also
irreplaceable.
34. Kennebec Water Dist. v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 A. 6 (1902).
In this case, the court followed the rule of the ordinary partial-taking
cases and refused to consider damages to the remaining area, since the
plant taken was physically independent of the other water supply properties owned by the company. Had this not been the case, special damages
would have been allowed.
35. Union Free School Dist. No. 8 v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.Y.S.
2d 416, 417 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
36. See discussion on p. 549 supra.

mined from the evidence, then there logically exists some other
method of evaluating the pecuniary loss of the condemnee.8 7 In
this situation, it has been held that the alternative method should
be used instead of the substitution method. 88 If the land in question, however, is of such a nature that it has no true "market
value, '3 9 then the property should be valued using the substitution
40
theory.
When a case does not lend itself to valuation by either the
"before and after" rule or the "value plus damages" method, the
court should investigate the possibility of minimizing the amount
of damages to be awarded under the "replacement-restoration"
method. This is the only way to insure that the public does not
pay an excessive award. The compensation "must be just not only
to the person whose property is taken but also to the taker [which
generally is the public] who must pay for it." 41 When damage to
the remainder of the condemnee's land can be avoided by making
repairs, and the cost of repairs will be less than the substitution
cost, then these repair costs should properly be the measure of
damages awarded. 42 The condemnee is thus placed in a position
where he has a duty to minimize the damages by taking preventative measures which will restore the potentiality of the land
for the use of which the condemnee has been deprived.43 The cost
of these repairs, if found to be reasonable, may be considered in
determining the "just compensation" to which the owner is en44
titled.
This approach seems to be the most logical in diminishing
the loss to both the condemner and condemnee under all three
methods of valuation discussed. This practice is followed in cases
involving the construction of retaining walls necessitated by road
grade changes. For example, a Pennsylvania case 48 held that
37.

If the land can be valued according to the fair market value of the

acre units, then this indicates that there is no need to resort to the sub-

stitution method as the only equitable means of awarding damages. , The
courts should only use the replacement-restoration cost method in "unusual

circumstances," and land which can equitably be valued using the first or
second method does not qualify for this classification.

38. Union Free School Dist. No. 8 v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 373, 230 N.Y.S.2d
416, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
39. There are a few exceptional cases in which market value cannot

be the legal standard because the property is of such nature and applied to

such special use that it cannot have a market value, such as a church,
college, cemetery, clubhouse, or terminal of a railroad. Chicago v. Farwell,

286 Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1919).

Included in this list is property which is

not actually bought and sold on the open market because of the fact that it

is specially adapted to the uses to which it is devoted.
40. United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958).
41. Garrison v. New York, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196 (1874).

42. United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764, 771 (10th Cir. 1959); Kersey
v. Schuykill River R.R., 133 Pa. 234, 19 A. 553 (1890).
43. Closser v. Washington Co., 20 Wash, 90 (C.P. Pa. 1939).
44. 4 NIcHOLS, supra note 8, at 651.

45. Greenawalt v. West Newton Borough, 64 Pa. Super. 576 (1916).
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where a town changed the grade of a highway and this change
necessitated the readjustment of a driveway, water and gas lines,
and the building of a retraining wall to protect steep terraces from
erosion, the cost of these repairs was admissible.
The court reasoned that the "cost of preserving property in
the condition it was prior to the change of grade, or its restoration
thereto, is a proper element to be considered in making an estimate
of the market value.' '48 Consideration of the cost of restoring property using a retaining wall was justified by pointing out that there
had been no attempt to show the cost of changing the plaintiff's
property to a condition which did not exist prior to the grade
47
change.
Thus, the prerequisite which permits inclusion of restoration
costs in the determination of "just compensation" is a finding that
the condemnee only asks for the return of his remaining property
to its most advantageous present use. If he is asking for the cost
of repairs which will place him in a better position, physically or
pecuniarily, than he maintained prior to the condemnation, then
these costs should not be awarded.
A rough measuring device is therefore formed by which courts
are able to determine whether eminent domain cases can be valued
using the replacement-substitution and/or restoration cost theory.
To meet the requirements of this method, a case must involve the
taking of land owned by a municipal or public service corporation.
This land must also be vital to the continued service the corporation is required to perform for the public. In addition, the land
must not have a market value in the traditional sense. If the land
in question fulfills these requirements, the court should value the
damage done to the condemnee according to the "substitution"
method. Once this is done the court must determine whether the
cost to the public can be minimized by awarding restoration costs
in place of substitution. The formula then is:
Remainder Area ...which may be Rehabilitated: Value
of Part Taken & Cost of Rehabilitation - Value Recovered
by Reconstruction = Just Compensation or Value of Entire
Tract = Just Compensation (whichever result is less).48
APPLICATION OF THIRD METHOD TO PENNSYLVANIA GAS AND WATER

In Pennsylvania Gas and Water, the majority believed the factual situation warranted valuation by the third method. They did
46. Id. at 579.
47.
48.

Id. at 579.
4 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 542.

point out, however, that under normal circumstances "fair market
value" remained the only available relief. 49 The case involved the
taking of land belonging to a public service corporation by another
public servant, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission. This in
itself did not remove the case from the traditional methods of
valuation, but rather it was the nature of the land which provided
the justification for measuring the damages differently. This land
was purchased for and especially suited for usage as a future reservoir with a specific capacity. Reservoir land does not have a market value in the traditional sense, since by its very nature and the
nature of the business of its owner it is not bought and sold or
traded on the open market. In addition, if the land was reduced
from the original reservoir capacity, the Gas and Water Company
would be unable to fulfill its duty to supply the area with an
adequate amount of water.
The dissent used two lines of reasoning for not allowing replacement value as damages. First, replacement value has never
been and never should be an appropriate test for recoverable
damages in eminent domain proceedings, and the measure of just
compensation to which an owner is entitled should always be the
"before and after" rule.50 This approach fails to recognize that
valuation under eminent domain is not an exact science. Furthermore, it is contrary to the modern trend which recognizes that
situations exist where the compensation would not be "just" unless
awarded on a different basis than that used in the traditional case. 51
As previously shown, a number of courts have recognized that
where these peculiar circumstances do exist, they merit the appli-.
cation of the substitution and/or restoration cost theory of damages.
The dissent's second reason for not permitting the award to
be based on replacement or repair costs was that it would not meet
the requirement that compensation be "just" to the condemner as
well as the condemnee. 52 Even if the Gas and Water Company
was denied recovery based on replacement value, it could still
purchase a substitute site or restroe the remainder. The investment necessary to do this could then be recovered in the establishment of the rates it will charge the public. 53 This, according
to the dissent, is sufficient reason for relieving the Turnpike Com49. 428 Pa. 74, 84, 236 A.2d 112, 117 (1967).
50. Id. at 85, 236 A.2d at 118.
51. See United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958);
Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952); Mayor v. United
States, 147 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1945).
52. 428 Pa. 74, 89, 236 A.2d 112, 120 (dissenting opinion).
53. Justice Eagen reasoned in the dissent that if the Pennsylvania Gas
and Water Company bought a substitute site or restored the site to its
original capacity, the investment, used in rate-making by the P.U.C. to
determine what revenue is reasonable, would be no less because it is
traceable to condemnation damages. See Burgettstown v. West Penn
Water Co., 29 P.U.C. 410 (1951).
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mission of the duty to pay for the damage done by condemnation,
as computed by the replacement-restoration theory. This attitude
regarding placing the burden of providing the new site is inequitable. The Turnpike Commission is the condemning party. Yet the
dissent desires to burden the condemnee with the problem of obtaining a substitute site or restoring the original site to its planned
capacity. In either case, the public will eventually be required to
pay for the damage done by the taking of the site. It would be
more equitable to require the Turnpike Commission to follow the
provisions of the statute which creates its powers and defines its
responsibilities. In this case, the applicable statute is the Pennsylvania Turnpike Northeastern Extension Act of September 27,
1951.1 4 Section 6(k) of this enabling act provides that:
Adequate compensation shall be made by the Commission
out of funds provided under authority of this Act for damages to all public or private property taken, injured or destroyed in carrying out the powers granted by this Act, or
such property may be restored or repaired and placed in
its original condition as nearly as practicable, as the Commission may deem it expedient in any particular case.55
This section of the statute clearly requires the Turnpike Commission to pay adequate compensation for all public property
taken or injured. Injury should not mean solely physical injury,
but should also include injury done to the condemnee's ability to
make the most advantageous use of the property. The Act provides
a means for the Commission to decrease the monetary amount it
will have to pay by providing that, if it deems it expedient, it can
restore and/or place the condemnee's property to its original con:
dition as nearly as possible.
The public will be burdened with the cost of the new site or
repairs to the old site no matter which method is used. Had the
court decided that the Pennsylvania Gas and Water Company
should not be awarded either the replacement or restoration cost,
then the public would pay for the substitute or restored site in the
form of increased rates. The court's holding that the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission should pay for the damage according to the
replacement-restoration cost method, still requires the public to
pay in the form of tolls to cover the expense of the turnpike. 56
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 660.8(a) (1961).
55. Id. at 36 § 660.6(k).
56. Section 2 of the Act provides that the construction of the turnpike is to be financed through revenue bonds. These bonds are to be retired solely from revenues of the Commission, including tolls, or from
such funds as may be available to the Commission for that purpose. In

1964 EMINENT

DOMAIN CODE

The decision in Pennsylvania Gas and Water was made, without reference to the 1964 Eminent Domain Code now in effect in
Pennsylvania. 57 The reason for this was that the property was
condemned prior to the efective date of the statute. 58
The 1964 Eminent Domain Code provides that the measure or
"just compensation" is to be:
[T] he difference between the fair market value of the condemnee's entire property interest immediately before the
condemnation and as unaffected thereby and the fair
market value of his property interest remaining immediately after such condemnation and as affected thereby,
and such other damages as are provided in this article.59
This is the "before and after" rule and allows certain additional
damages which may result from the taking.6 0 No provision is made
for the award of damages according to the "replacement-restoration cost" method. The legislature has deemed it more expedient
to consider all condemnation proceedings alike. In view of the
decision in Pennsylvania Gas and Water, this approach is too restrictive. The statute should be amended to allow for "unusual
circumstances." The 1964 Code was promulgated prior to Pennsylvania Gas and Water and was unable to reflect the reasoning of
the majority in that case. The holding in Pennsylvania Gas and
Water should be followed in future cases in order to insure "just
compensation" to the condemnee, and to keep pace with modern
trend in the valuation of eminent domain claims.
CONCLUSION
The ruling in Pennsylvania Gas and Water allows juries to
hear evidence as to the means of returning a public utility corporation to a position of ability to serve the public. The decision reinforces the rulings cited above which have recognized that situations
exist which call for the application of a different method of valuation than those traditionally used. The land of the public service
corporation should be included in this area. A public servant has
a duty to fulfill, which the owner of private property has not
assumed, and it is because of this duty that courts have and must
continue to treat public utility property in a different manner than
actuality, then, the cost of paying for the substitute site is paid by the
public which uses the turnpike instead of the rate-paying public. This
shifts the burden to those who receive the benefit of the condemnation.
57. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 26 § 1-101 (1968).
58. The effective date of the 1964 Eminent Domain Code was September 1, 1964 and applied only to land condemned after that date. The land
taken in Pennsylvania Gas and Water was condemned on June 8, 1954.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1-602 (1968).
60. The measure or damages allows for removal expenses (§ 1-608),
business "dislocation" damages (§ 1-609), moving expenses (§ 1-610), delay
compensation (§ 1-611) and consequential damages (§ 1-612).
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private property. This concept is relatively recent and is a major
break from the "fair market value" concept of achieving "just
compensation." It is a necessary component of the laws of valuation in eminent domain proceedings. If, in the case of the taking
of public utility land, the jury decides that the parcel taken is not
necessary to the successful fulfillment of the utility's duty to the
public, then it should adhere to the traditional rules of valuation.
There exists, however, a definite need for a method of compensating the public utility which has necessary land taken that is
specially suited for the duty the utility has undertaken to perform.
This is where the replacement-restoration cost theory should be
utilized. Without this theory of valuation and its application to
such situations, forward looking courts will be unable to award
"just compensation."
FRANCIS MONTBACH

